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Standard theories of insurance, dating from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), stress the role of adverse
selection in explaining the decision to purchase insurance.  In these models, higher risk people buy
full or near-full insurance, while lower risk people buy less complete coverage, if they buy at all.  While
this prediction appears to hold in some real world insurance markets, in many others, it is the lower
risk individuals who have more insurance coverage. If the standard model is extended to allow individuals
to vary in their risk tolerance as well as their risk type, this could explain why the relationship between
insurance coverage and risk occurrence can be of any sign, even if the standard asymmetric information
effects also exist. We present empirical evidence in five difference insurance markets in the United
States that is consistent with this potential role for risk tolerance. Specifically, we show that individuals
who engage in risky behavior or who do not engage in risk reducing behavior are systematically less
likely to hold life insurance, acute private health insurance, annuities, long-term care insurance, and
Medigap. Moreover, we show that the sign of this preference effect differs across markets, tending
to induce lower risk individuals to purchase insurance in some of these markets, but higher risk individuals
to purchase insurance in others. These findings suggest that preference heterogeneity may be important
























The textbook approach to insurance markets emphasizes the role of private information about risk in 
determining who purchases insurance. In the classic adverse selection model of Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976), individuals with higher expected claims buy more insurance than those with lower expected claims, 
who may be out of the market entirely. This basic prediction of asymmetric information models of a 
“positive correlation” between insurance coverage and accident occurrence has been shown to be robust to a 
variety of extensions to the standard framework (Chiappori and Salanie 2000, Chiappori et al. 2006).  
Evidence of this positive correlation has been found in several insurance markets, particularly acute 
health insurance and annuities.
1  Yet it many other insurance markets, those with more insurance appear to 
have the same or lower occurrences of the insured risk than those with less insurance. This phenomenon of 
“advantageous selection” has been documented in both large insurance markets such as life insurance 
(Cawley and Philipson 1999, McCarthy and Mitchell 2003) and Medigap insurance (Hurd and McGarry 
1997, Ettner 1997, Fang et al. 2006), and in extremely thin markets such as long-term care insurance 
(Finkelstein and McGarry 2006) and reverse mortgages (Davidoff and Welke 2005). Moreover advantageous 
selection has been detected in an insurance market despite evidence that, as in the standard asymmetric 
information models, individuals also have private information about their risk type that is positively 
correlated with insurance demand (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). This discrepancy between theory and 
reality is even more striking given that moral hazard would tend to increase the risk occurrence of those with 
more insurance relative to those with less.    
A potential explanation for this puzzle is that individuals may vary in their tolerance for risk in addition 
to their riskiness.  When individuals are heterogeneous in their preferences as well as their risk type, the 
relationship between insurance coverage and risk occurrence can be of any sign (e.g. Fang et al., 2006, 
Finkelstein and McGarry 2006, Chiappori et al., 2007, Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf, 2007, Jullien et al., 
                                                 
1 Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) review a large literature that tends to find a positive correlation between insurance 
coverage and risk occurrence in health insurance, although important exceptions such as Cardon and Hendel (2001) 
exist. Evidence of the positive correlation in annuities has been documented in the U.S. (Mitchell et al., 199), the U.K. 
(Finkelstein and Poterba 2002, 2004, and 2006) and in Japan (McCarthy and Mitchell 2003).    3
2007). For example, individuals with lower tolerance for risk may not only demand more insurance but may 
also invest in activities that lower their expected claims. Such preference effects could offset standard 
asymmetric information effects to produce an advantageously selected equilibrium in which those with lower 
expected claims demand more insurance; as a result, the insurance market may exhibit over-insurance 
relative to the first best, rather than the under-insurance of classic, uni-dimensional adverse selection models 
(de Meza and Webb 2001).   
When risk type is endogenous to risk tolerance, the correlation between preferences for insurance and 
expected claims need not be the same across markets. A risk averse person might invest in annuities and as 
well as engage in behaviors that decrease mortality; thus, for annuity purchasers there would be a positive 
correlation between insurance holdings and the insured risk of living a long time.  The same person might 
also buy life insurance, however, leading to a negative correlation between the mortality risk that life 
insurance insures and life insurance holdings.   Whether this potential countervailing preference effect 
materializes in practice, and whether it is large enough to offset the standard asymmetric information effects, 
is an empirical question.
2 
The existing evidence is consistent with a potentially important role for preference heterogeneity in 
understanding insurance market equilibria. A growing empirical literature has found evidence of substantial 
preference heterogeneity in insurance demand.  Examples include automobile insurance (Cohen and Einav 
2007), long-term care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry 2006), reverse mortgages (Davidoff and Welke 
2005), Medigap (Fang, Keane and Silverman 2006), and annuities (Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf 2007). 
These papers raise the possibility that heterogeneity in preferences may be as or more important than 
heterogeneity in risk in explaining insurance demand. They also suggest that the correlation between 
preferences for insurance and expected claims is not the same across markets. For example, in both annuities 
and auto insurance there is evidence that those with greater preferences for insurance have higher expected 
                                                 
2 For example, it is not a priori clear that more risk averse individuals will invest more in activities that lower their 
expected claims. Preventive activity has a first order effect on the mean of the risk distribution; more risk averse 
individuals care about reducing the variance of this distribution, which may be positively or negatively correlated with 
the mean (see e.g. Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985 and Jullien et al., 1999).   4
insurance claims, which would reinforce the standard asymmetric information effect (Einav, Finkelstein and 
Schrimpf, 2007; Cohen and Einav, 2007). However, in Medigap, long-term care insurance and reverse 
mortgages, those with higher preferences for insurance appear to have lower expected claims, creating 
offsetting advantageous selection (Fang et al, 2006, Finkelstein and McGarry 2006, Davidoff and Welke 
2005). These findings raise the possibility that differences in the relationship between preferences and 
expected claims may help explain the observed differences in whether the market appears advantageously or 
adversely selected.   
In this paper, we examine the relation between risky behaviors, insurance purchases, and risk occurrence 
in five different insurance markets: life insurance, acute health insurance, annuities, long-term care 
insurance, and Medicare supplemental insurance (Medigap). The analysis is highly complementary to the 
studies of individual insurance markets discussed above. Indeed, the same data source was used in earlier 
studies of long term care insurance (Finkelstein McGarry 2006) and Medigap (Fang et al. 2006), although we 
examine a different set of preference measures. Our main contribution is to show results across several 
different insurance markets using a common data set and empirical framework.  
1.  Data and empirical framework 
Our analysis uses individual-level data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We use the sample 
of people aged 51 to 61 in 1992 to examine the holding of term life insurance and private acute health 
insurance among prime-age individuals.  We use a second HRS cohort, the Asset and Health Dynamics 
(AHEAD) sample, to examine Medigap insurance, long-term care insurance, and annuities among people 
aged 65 to 90 in 1995.  We use the panel nature of these data to track mortality and nursing home outcomes 
for individuals in both panels through 2002. Table 1 presents key summary statistics for each sample.
3 The 
average age in our 1992 HRS sample is 56 and in the 1995 AHEAD sample it is 79. 
Our basic test is to examine how measures of risk tolerance are related to the occurrence of risk, 
and to whether the individual has insurance.  Risk tolerance is not easily measured.  We proxy for 
                                                 
3 We use individual sample weights when calculating the means. The regressions presented later in the paper are 
unweighted.   5
risk tolerance using five measures of behaviors that likely capture individual risk aversion: 
smoking; drinking; job-based mortality risk; receipt of preventive health care; and use of seat belts.  
While each of these variables will reflect factors in addition to risk tolerance, results that are 
consistent across the variables suggest that risk tolerance is an important part of their variability.   
We show results from two main types of analysis, designed to examine, respectively, the relationship 
between risk tolerance and insurance demand, and between risk toleranceand risk occurrence.  We therefore 
estimate the following two equations by OLS:  
i i i i X Behavior insurance ε β β + Γ + + = 1 0 ) ( 1       ( 1 )  
i i i i X Behavior nce Riskoccure η α α + Π + + = 1 0       ( 2 )  
In these equations  i insurance) ( 1  is an indicator variable for whether the individual has a particular type of 
insurance,  i nce Riskoccure  is a measure of the occurrence of the risk the insurance in question would cover, 
i Behavior  is one of our measures of risk tolerance, and X represents covariates. We describe each in more 
detail in turn. 
1.1 Insurance and risk occurrence measures 
We measure life insurance by whether the individual has term life insurance in the 1992 HRS; 
approximately 50 percent of the sample has this insurance.
4  The risk occurrence measure for life insurance is 
whether the individual dies between 1992 and 2002; 13 percent die.  
We measure acute private health insurance in the 1992 HRS by whether the individual has private health 
insurance through a current or former employer, a spouse’s employer, or the non-group market; we exclude 
individuals who report coverage through a government program (e.g. Medicaid, Medicare, CHAMPUS or 
CHAMPVA) from the analysis of the acute health insurance market. About 86 percent of the sample has 
acute private health insurance; of this 86, the vast majority (82 percent) have employment-related coverage. 
The corresponding risk occurrence measure is whether the individual reports any hospital use in the previous 
                                                 
4 Another 21 percent own whole life insurance but no term policy. We focus on term life insurance which is a pure 
insurance vehicle, rather than whole life insurance which combines an insurance vehicle with a savings instrument.    6
two years; 9 percent of the sample does. Hospital use is a strong predictor of medical expenses, which is the 
actual insured risk but which we do not directly observe in the data. 
Our third measure of insurance, from the AHEAD, is whether an individual has an annuity in 1995.  
Approximately 7% of the 1995 AHEAD sample has an annuity.
5 The corresponding risk occurrence measure 
is the opposite of that for life insurance, specifically  whether the individual survives from 1995 to 2002; 62 
percent of the sample survives.  
Fourth, we measure whether the individual has Medicare supplemental coverage (termed Medigap) in the 
1995 AHEAD. Medigap policies cover many of the expenses not insured by Medicare, including coinsurance 
and deductibles.
6 We define an individual as having Medigap if he has a (non-government provided) health 
insurance policy in addition to Medicare.
7  Nearly 70 percent of the sample has Medigap coverage. Our 
corresponding risk occurrence measure is the medical expenses reported in 1995 arising from hospital and 
doctor visits that could have been covered by a Medigap policy; the mean is $911.
8  
Finally, we define an individual has having long term care insurance in the 1995 AHEAD if they answer 
a question about this coverage affirmatively.
9 About 10 percent have long term care insurance. The 
corresponding risk occurrence measure is whether the individual goes into a nursing home between 1995 and 
2002; about one-quarter of the sample does.  
1.2 Behavior measures 
                                                 
5 Holding an annuity is defined as an affirmative answer to a question in the survey asking if he has annuity income 
from a source other than Social Security or a Defined Benefit Pension. Because our sample for this analysis consists of 
those aged 65 or older, we do not believe that many will start receiving annuity payments at a later date. 
6 During the period of time covered by our data, some Medigap policies also provided prescription drug coverage. 
7 The question asks, “Not counting long-term care insurance or [Medicare, Medicaid, government health insurance] do 
you have any health insurance that pays any part of hospital or doctor bills? (Sometimes this is called a Medi-Gap 
policy).” 
8 The HRS reports the number of doctor and hospital visits an individual experienced since the previous interview 
(approximately 2 years).  To translate these numbers into an estimate of expenditures not covered by Medicare we 
assume an uncovered (by Medicare) expenditure of $100 for the first and second doctor visit in a two year period (i.e. 
the annual Medicare part B deductible in 1995) and $20 for each additional visit (i.e. the 20% part B coinsurance). We 
also assume a cost of $716 for each hospital visit (ie.. the Medicare Part A deductible in 1995). No attempt is made to 
account for hospital stays beyond 60 days at which a copayment kicks in; this is a very rare event in our sample. We do 
not attempt to measure other potentially covered expenses such as prescription drugs.  We do not also impute total 
spending for acute health insurance as it would require more detailed information than is available about medical care 
utilization. 
9 The question in the 1995 wave of AHEAD is “Aside from the government programs, do you now have any insurance 
which specifically pays any part of long-term care, such as, personal or medical care in the home or in a nursing home?     7
We have five behavior measures that we observe in both the HRS and AHEAD samples. Three are 
measures of risky behavior: (1) whether the individual currently smokes (2) whether the individual has a 
drinking problem (defined as three or more drinks per day), and (3) the mortality rate per 100,000 employees 
in the individual’s industry-occupation cell (for the HRS) or occupation cell (for the AHEAD).
10  On 
average, in our 1992 sample of near-elderly, 27 percent of people smoke, 5 percent have a drinking problem, 
and the average mortality risk by industry-occupation cell is 4 fatalities per 100,000 employees.  Smoking 
rates are lower in the elderly (7.6 percent of the sample), reflecting the strong difference in mortality by 
smoking status at older ages.   
We also construct two measures of active steps individuals can take to reduce mortality and healthy risk: 
(1) the fraction of gender-appropriate preventive health activity undertaken,
11 and (2) whether the individual 
reports always wearing a seat belt. For our 1995 AHEAD sample, we observe these measures 
contemporaneously in 1995. Unfortunately, for the 1992 HRS sample, these measures are first available in 
1996. Our analysis of the preventive health behaviors and seat belt use for the 1992 insurance variables 
therefore suffers from potential sample selection bias; to observe this behavior the individual must survive 
until 1996. On average in the 1992 HRS sample, individuals undertake 60 percent of gender-appropriate 
health activities, and 80 report always wearing a seat belt. For the 1995 AHEAD sample, the figures are 65 
percent and 83 percent.  
We examine both the simple, unconditional bivariate relationship between each of these behaviors and 
either insurance coverage or risk occurrence. We also report results in which we control for covariates (X) 
designed to capture the risk classification used by insurers.  Conditioning on the characteristics used in 
pricing insurance is crucial for papers testing the predictions of standard adverse selection models, as these 
                                                 
10 The mortality rates are from Viscusi (2003), who uses data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Census of Fatal 
Occupational Injuries. We define industry-occupation cells (or occupation alone) based on current job (if any), 
including self employment. If the individual is not currently employed we use the most recent job or, if this variable is 
missing, the most significant prior attachment. If the individual has never held a job (or all of these measures are 
missing) the measure of industry-occupation mortality risk is missing.   
 
11 These activities are: whether the individual had a flu shot; had a blood test for cholesterol; checked her breasts for 
lumps monthly; had a mammogram or breast x-ray; had a Pap smear; had a prostate screen. See Finkelstein and 
McGarry (2006) for a study using these variables in this manner.   8
predictions are about how people behave conditional on the menu of contracts they face (Chiappori and 
Salanie, 2000). However, when examining the influence of preferences on insurance demand and risk type, 
the unconditional relationships may be of greater interest, since we are primarily interested in how 
preferences mediate the insurance – risk occurrence relationship through their impact on both risky behavior 
and insurance valuation. We thus emphasize the unconditional relationships although we present the 
conditional relationships as well for completeness and for comparability with the existing literature.  
Appendix A describes the risk classification controls in detail. 
2. Results 
2.1 Insurance demand and risky behavior 
Table 2 examines the relationship between the various behaviors and each of the five insurance products. 
It reports the results from estimating equation (1) both with (even columns) and without (odd columns) 
conditioning variables. The results are remarkably consistent across behavior measures and across insurance 
types. Individuals who engage in more risky behavior are systematically less likely to have each type of 
insurance; the results are not sensitive to whether or not we control for risk classification.  
The relationships between risky behavior and insurance coverage are particularly strong for preventive 
health activity and seat belt use – which are positively and statistically significantly correlated with having 
each insurance product – and for the mortality rate of the individual’s industry-occupation cell – which is 
negatively and statistically significantly correlated with each type of insurance coverage. Similar patterns are 
present – but are somewhat less robust – for smoking and drinking. Smokers are statistically significantly 
less likely to have life insurance, annuities, Medigap, and private health insurance, but there is no discernable 
relationship between smoking and long-term care insurance. Individuals who drink are almost always less 
likely to have each type of insurance, but the results are rarely statistically significant.
12 
Our interpretation of these findings is that more risk averse individuals both invest in more risk reducing 
(less risky) behavior and value insurance more.  Consistent with this, we find suggestive evidence of a 
                                                 
12 Both smoking and drinking are thought to be addictive and altering one’s behavior along these dimensions is likely to 
be more difficult that deciding to wear a seat belt or get a flu shot. They may therefore be less representative of current 
preferences than other variables.   9
negative relationship between risk aversion and risky behavior. As a proxy for risk aversion, we use the 
respondents’ answers to questions concerning their willingness to engage in various hypothetical income 
gambles.
13 This variable is available only for the 1992 HRS sample. Based on the answers, we form four 
ordinal categorical variables of decreasing risk aversion and examine their relationship with risky behavior. 
About 65 percent of the sample falls in the most risk averse category; the remainder are roughly evenly split 
across the other three risk aversion categories.  
Table 3 reports our results concerning the relationship between various risky behaviors and these ordinal 
measures of risk aversion. Overall, the evidence suggests that those who are in the least risk averse category 
are more likely to engage in various risky behaviors (or less likely to engage in risk reducing behaviors) than 
those in the most risk averse category, although the differences are statistically significant only for the risky 
behaviors measures, and not for the risk reducing behaviors.
14   
2.2 Risky behavior and risk occurrence 
Table 4 examines the relationship between risky behavior and risky outcomes, equation (2) above.  As in 
Table 2, we report both unconditional and conditional estimates, and focus on the unconditional estimates. 
The first two panels examine the relationship between more risky (less risk reducing) behaviors and 
mortality in the life insurance sample (Panel A) and the annuity sample (Panel B). The results show a broad 
pattern that more risky behavior (smoking, drinking, and higher mortality occupations and industries) is 
associated with (usually statistically significantly) higher mortality, and that investment in risk reducing 
behavior (preventive health activity or seat belt wearing) is associated with (usually statistically significant) 
lower mortality. These findings suggest that preferences for insurance – and their differential relationship 
with risk in life insurance and annuities – may be able to explain the different patterns observed in these two 
                                                 
13 The survey questions as respondents if they would be willing to trade a good job with a steady income equal to their 
current family income for a new job with a “50-50 chance it will double your (family) income and a 50-50 chance that it 
will cut your (family) income by a third.”  A second question increases or decreases the possible gain / loss in income 
depending on the response to the initial question. These responses can be used to group people into four risk-tolerance 
categories.  
14 Using additional assumptions (e.g. that the utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion) and data, Barksy et 
al. (1997) construct measures of average risk tolerance for the four categories and find even more pronounced 
relationships between risk aversion and risky behaviors than what we report using the ordinal measures.    10
markets of the relative risk profile of those with more insurance. Individuals who engage in less risky (more 
risk reducing) behavior demand both more life insurance and more annuities (Table 2) and have higher 
mortality (Table 4). From the insurance company perspective, this makes them lower expected cost for life 
insurance (less likely to die and make a claim), thus offsetting the standard adverse selection pattern, but 
higher expected cost for annuities (less likely to die and stop making claims), thus reinforcing the standard 
adverse selection pattern. 
Life insurance is one of the largest private insurance markets in the world. Previous work has 
demonstrated that the market does not exhibit higher ownership rates among higher risk individuals, as 
standard adverse selection or moral hazard models would predict (Cawley and Philipson 1999, McCarthy and 
Mitchell 2003). Nor does variability in financial exposure explain ownership patterns (Bernheim et al. 2003a 
2003b). Our empirical results suggest that heterogeneity in risk tolerance may be able to provide a sensible 
explanation for the observed patterns of coverage. Specifically, we find that individuals who engage in more 
risky behavior are both higher mortality risk and less likely to purchase insurance.  
Panel C examines at the relationship between behaviors and subsequent use of nursing homes.  Although 
there is no systematic relationship between risky behaviors and nursing home use, we find that individuals 
who engage in more risk reducing behavior – be it preventive health activity or seat belt use – are less likely 
to go into a nursing home between 1995 and 2002. This finding was previously documented by Finkelstein 
and McGarry (2006) over a different time period, who argue that the link between more risk reducing 
behavior, demand for insurance, and expected claims may explain why the insured do not, on average, have 
higher nursing home use than the uninsured.   
Panel D looks at the relationship between the various behaviors and the risk Medigap insures of medical 
expenditures not covered by Medicare.  The results are mixed; some risky behaviors are correlated with 
lower medical expenditures while others are correlated with higher medical expenditures; the same 
ambiguity is present for the risk reducing behaviors. The results are similar if we use the number of doctor 
visits or the number of nights spent in a hospital as the dependent variable (not shown). Some of these 
behaviors therefore act to offset the standard asymmetric information effects, while others serve to reinforce   11
them.  Fang et al. (2006) have documented additional sources of advantageous selection in Medigap. In 
particular, those with higher cognitive ability are both more likely to purchase Medigap and have lower 
expected claims.  
Finally, Panel E looks at the relationship between the various behaviors and whether the individual 
has any hospital use, which is an important component of the costs that acute private health 
insurance would cover.  The results are similar if we use the number of doctor visits or the number of 
nights spent in a hospital as the dependent variable (not shown). Again the results are mixed; some risky 
behaviors are correlated with lower utilization while others are correlated with higher utilization.  
3.  Interpretation and Conclusions 
Our analysis yields two main findings. First, in all five markets, we find that individuals who engage in 
what are commonly thought of as risky behaviors (smoking, drinking, or prior employment in jobs with 
higher mortality rates) or who do not take measures to thought to reduce risk (preventive health activities or 
wearing of a seat belt) are systematically less likely to hold each of these insurance products.
15  Second, we 
find that these same individuals tend to have higher expected claims for life insurance and long term care 
insurance, but lower expected claims for annuities; for Medigap and acute health insurance, there is no 
systematic relationship between the behavior measures and expected claims.   
These results can help to explain the puzzle of insurance we started with: why is adverse selection not 
more common?  In annuity markets, there is clear evidence of adverse selection: people who live longer are 
more likely to buy insurance.  The standard adverse selection model is one explanation for this, but so is 
variation in risk tolerance; people who have less risky behaviors live longer and are more likely to buy 
annuities.  In life insurance, our results suggest that differential risk tolerance can help explain why people 
with lower mortality rates have more insurance.  Similarly, in the case of long-term care insurance, people 
who use more preventive care or are more likely to wear seat belts buy insurance more readily but also stay 
                                                 
15 Here we use the term “risk” to denote the chance of what is generally considered to be an undesirable event for the 
individual (namely, worse health or death). Of course, in the context of insurance purchasing, the “risk” depends on 
what is being insured. For example, from the insurance company’s perspective a high mortality individual will be “high 
risk” as a life insurance consumer but “low risk” as an annuity buyer.      12
out of nursing homes.  For acute health insurance, the lack of any systematic offsetting effect of risk 
tolerance may explain why the preponderance of studies have found that this market is, on net, adversely 
selected. In the case of Medigap, other sources of advantageous selection than risk tolerance appear to be 
necessary to understand why this market is on net advantageously selected; indeed, Fang, Keane and 
Silverman (2006) have documented that those with higher cognitive ability are both more likely to purchase 
Medigap and have lower expected claims.  
Overall, our findings suggest that preferences for insurance – and their impact on risk occurrence and 
insurance purchase – may help explain the different patterns of selection observed in different insurance 
markets. These preference effects thus provide a potential unifying explanation for the differential patterns in 
insurance coverage across different markets.  
Our results have a number of implications.  Most importantly, they suggest that in considering the nature 
of market inefficiencies created by private information in insurance markets, the possibility of over-insurance 
from advantageous selection should be considered in addition to the under-insurance concern of classic, uni-
dimensional adverse selection models. The implications of this for welfare have received some attention (de 
Meza and Webb 2001) and are a fruitful subject for future research.  13
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Sample 
Variable  1992 HRS  1995 AHEAD 
Average Age  56.0 (3.2)  79.0 (4.8) 
% Male  47.6  39.8 
% Married  76.8  52.5 
Behaviors    
Smoker 26.9  7.6 
Drinking problem  5.3  3.0 
Mortality risk of industry-
occupation cell 
3.98 (5.50)  3.79 (4.13) 






Fraction always using seatbelt  79.6  83.0 
   
Insurance    
% with Term Life insurance  50.7  --- 
% with Acute Private Health 
Insurance 
86.1  
% with Medigap  ----  69.5 
% with Long-Term Care 
Insurance 
----- 10.2 
% with Annuity  ----  7.5 
N 11,913  7,183 
Number  of observations varies across variables due to missing values. The number of observations is unweighted. 
Individuals specific weights for 1992 and 1995 are used. The measure of any health insurance excludes those who are 
covered by a government programs (e.g. Medicare, Medicaid, CHAMPUS, CHAMPVA). Medigap includes any health 
insurance policy that supplements Medicare, it may be provided through a current or former employer (or spouse’s 
employer) or privately purchased.  Term life insurance includes those policies provided by an employer as well as 




  Table 2: The relationship between risky (or risk reducing) behavior and insurance coverage.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9)  (10) 
RHS var  Smoker  Drinking problem 
Mortality Risk in 
Industry-Occupation cell 
Preventative Health 
Activity  Always wear seat belt 
 





















Controls  No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes 
N  11453  10385  11453  10385  10556  9582 9773  8952 9805 8983 
 





















Controls  No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes 
N  6420 6371      6393 6345 4878 4835 6251  6203 6408 6359 
 





















Controls  No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes 
N  6401 5396 6376 5377 4845 4145 6233  5312 6390 5394 
 





















Controls  No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes 
N  6383 6383 6357 6357 4852 4852 6218  6218 6373 6373 
 












Control  No   No   No   No   No   
N  10,945   10,945   10,207   9,411   9,448   
Note: Table reports results from OLS regressions. Dependent variable is given in panel headings.  First row gives coefficient on right hand side variable listed at the 
top of the column.  All right hand side variables are measured in the year insurance is measured (1992 or 1995 as indicated) except for preventive health activity and 
seat belt use for 1992 insurance coverage where they are measured in 1996. Additional controls consist of variables used by the insurance company to assess risk. 
They vary by insurance market. For life insurance and long-term care insurance we use an array of health measures, age, smoking status, and sex. For annuities we use 
age, spouse’s age and sex. For Medigap coverage we use age.  See Appendix A for a complete listing of control variables.   Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively   17 
 
 
Table 3: The relationship between risk aversion and risky behavior  
 Indicator  for  Smoker 
(1992) 
Indicator for  
Drinking Problem (1992) 





Always Wear Seat  
Belt (1996) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (19) 
Most risk 
averse 






































































No  Yes No   Yes No   Yes No   Yes No   Yes 
N  11,040 10,564 11,040 10,564 10193  9,755  9,481  9,087  9,512  9,119 
Note: Table reports results from OLS regressions. Dependent variable is given in column headings.  Risk aversion is an ordinal measure based on willingness to accept 
various hypothetical gambles; see text and Barsky et al. (1997) for more details. Additional controls consist of variables used by the insurance company to assess risk. 
They vary by insurance market (see endnote to table 2).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively.   
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Table 4: The relationship between risky (or risk reducing) behavior and risky outcome  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
RHS var  Smoker  Drinking problem 




Activity  Always wear seat belt 





















Controls  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
N  11191 10141 11191 10141 10295 9348  10085 8988  10123 9023 





















Controls  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
N  6455 6403 6428 6377 5681 5072 6285 6234 6432 6382 





















Controls  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
N  6217 5307 6193 5288 4849 4070 6080 5227 6203 5306 






















Controls  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
N  6317 6317 6294 6294 4782 4782 6168 6168 6307 6307 
Panel E Dependent variables is 0/1 entered a hospital in the preceding two years from 1992 (mean= 0.091) 
Coeff -0.006 
(.006) 









Controls  No   No   No   No   No  
Note: Table reports results from OLS regressions. Dependent variables are given in panel headings.  First row in each panel gives coefficient on right hand side 
variable listed at the top of the column. All right hand side variables are measured in 1992 for Panel A and E except for preventive health activity and seat belt use 
which are measured in 1996; all right hand side variables in Panels C, D and E are measured in 1995. Additional controls consist of variables used by the insurance 
company to assess risk. They vary by insurance market. For life insurance we use an array of health measures, age, smoking status, and sex. For annuities we use age, 
spouse’s age and sex.  See Appendix A for further information.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively.  
  
† costs not covered my medicare are proxied by $100 for the first and second doctor visit in a two year period and $20 for each additional visit + $716 (medicare 
deductible in 1995) for each hospital visit. No attempt is made to account for stays beyond 60 days at which the copayment kicks in. ($179 for days 61-90) 8 people 
have just one stay of more than 60 days, 48 people have more than one stay and a TOTAL of more than 60 days. Appendix A: Definitions of risk classification controls 
 
In this appendix we provide a detailed description of the controls for risk that we use in each insurance 
market. We base our decisions of which factors to include by inspection of the information insurers 
collect and use in pricing premiums. We discuss, in turn, our controls in each market. We also verified 
that our results are not sensitive to the addition or subtraction of many variables.  
 
Life insurance classification risk: In the life insurance market the degree of underwriting 
depends on the size of the policy and the age of the applicant. In cases in which there is 
underwriting, the insured often undergoes an exam and / or receives a blood test. We include 
dummy variables indicating low (below 20) and high (above 30) body mass index. We also 
include indicators of difficulty with a series of activities of daily living (walking, getting in and 
out of bed, bathing, dressing and eating and the total number of such limitations), high blood 
pressure, diabetes or high blood sugar, whether the individual takes medication for diabetes, had 
cancer (other than skin cancer) , lung disease, heart disease or a heart attack, takes medication for 
heart disease, had a stroke, psychiatric problems, arthritis, asthma, kidney or bladder problems, 
high cholesterol, or a bone fracture. As a measure of cognitive function we include the number of 
words recalled immediately after having a list read and the number recalled after delay. We 
include indicators of whether the individual is married, smokes, dummy variables for individual 
ages, gender, male, number of limitations with respect to activities of daily living and an 
indicator of their depressive state based on CESD scores as recommended by Mehta et al. 
(2002). 
 
Acute health insurance risk classification: Because health insurance is obtained primarily 
through an employer, and there is no underwriting for employer provided coverage, we do not 
conduct any analysis using control variables. 
 
Annuity classification risk: In the United States, insurers providing annuities condition solely on 
age and sex. We use a complete set of dummy variables, one for each possible age, sex of the 
annuitant, and because many annuities are joint and survivor annuities (with benefits continuing 
as long as either spouse is alive), we also include dummy variables for the age of the spouse. 
 
LTCINS risk:  Applications for long-term care insurance policies collect a large amount of 
information on health status. We have indicators for nearly all such variables. Our controls 
include, dummy variables for age and spouse’s age, whether the respondent is married, or male, 
and dummy variables indicating low (below 20) and high (above 30) body mass index. We also 
include indicators of difficulty with a series of activities of daily living (walking, bathing, 
dressing, eating and toileting, and the total number of such limitations), indicators of use of 
equipment to help with tasks (a wheelchair, walker, crutches, oxygen, or  cane),  difficulties with 
grocery shopping or medication, the number of limitations with respect to instrumental activities 
of daily living, whether the individual regularly takes prescription drugs, has been injured in a 
fall, is incontinent, has kidney trouble, congestive heart failure, heart disease, high blood 
pressure, diabetes, or takes medication for diabetes. Whether he has been diagnosed with cancer, 
high blood pressure, arthritis, lung disease, currently smokes,  has had a hip fracture,  has 
difficulty taking medication, has had a heart attack, takes heart medication, has had a stroke, has 
psychiatric problems, is cognitively impaired or depressed (Mehta et al., 2002).   
 
Medigap risk:   There is no underwriting if a medigap policy is purchased at age 65. We control 
solely for age.  